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Ukraine, Russia and the EU: 
Breaking the deadlock in the 
Minsk process 
Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister* 
CEPS Working Document No. 423 / June 2016 
In late June 2016, when EU heads of state and government meet to discuss the extension of 
sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement its 
commitments in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in 
the Ukraine crisis, EU leaders ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push 
for the renegotiation of Minsk II, widen the ‘Normandy format’ and bolster reforms in 
Ukraine.  
1. Developing crisis 
The Euromaidan protests in 2013-14 were triggered by the refusal of President Viktor 
Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), with the EU. The protests turned into a revolution, 
resulting in the ouster of Yanukovych in February 2014. The Kremlin reacted by annexing 
Crimea (March 2014) and orchestrating war in parts of Donbas and the creation of two 
separatist so-called ‘republics’, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk 
People’s Republic (LPR). Because of the rejection of a military option, economic sanctions 
have become the core instrument of the EU and the US for responding to Russian aggression. 
Although the sanctions are rather limited compared to the former EU and US sanctions 
against Iran and some economists have expressed scepticism about their economic impact,1 
they are crucial to underpinning the credibility of the EU and influencing the cost-benefit 
calculation of the Russian leadership regarding Ukraine.   
The first major diplomatic attempt to halt the war and achieve a sustainable solution for the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine was the April 2014 “Geneva format” composed of Ukraine, 
Russia, the EU and the US. Its results were unedifying. The second attempt was the format of 
the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of representatives from Ukraine, Russia 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), under which a 
protocol and follow-up memorandum called Minsk I were prepared and signed by Ukraine, 
                                                   
* Hrant Kostanyan is a Researcher at CEPS, a Senior Key Expert at the College of Europe Natolin and 
an Adjunct Professor at Vesalius College in Brussels. Stefan Meister is Head of the Program for 
Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, at the Robert Bosch Center, German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP). The authors would like to thank Dmytro Shulga (International Renaissance 
Foundation, Ukraine) and Sergey Utkin (Centre for Situation Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences) 
for useful comments they gave on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 D. Gros and F. Mustilli (2015), “The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia: Much ado about 
very little”, CEPS Commentary (www.ceps.eu/publications/economic-impact-sanctions-against-
russia-much-ado-about-very-little).  
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Russia and representatives of the DPR and LPR on 5 September 2014.2 However, the 
ceasefire agreed in the framework of Minsk I never worked and collapsed completely with 
the battle over Debaltseve in January 2015. To stop this escalation, another round of 
negotiations took place in the context of the so-called Normandy format (involving Ukraine, 
Russia, Germany and France), which on 12 February 2015 resulted in a package of measures 
dubbed Minsk II.3 To give the new format more authority, the agreement was negotiated 
with the top leaders of all participating states personally.  
The EU imposed sanctions on Russia in parallel with those imposed by the US and other 
Western allies, in June 2014 (related to Crimea and Sevastopol) and on 31 July 2014 
(reinforced in September 2014) “in response to Russia’s actions in the east of Ukraine”.4 The 
additional restrictive measures against Russia continued to be adopted by the EU (and the 
international partners) as violations of the ceasefire continued, including after the battle of 
Debaltseve. Besides sanctioning persons linked to the annexation of Crimea and the war in 
eastern Ukraine, these restrictive measures cover financial, energy and defence sectors as 
well as dual-use goods. The EU sanctions are now prolonged until 31 July 2016 and can be 
extended another six months. EU heads of state and government tied removal of sanctions to 
the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. 
More than a year after the signature of the Minsk II package, despite the dialogue conducted 
in trilateral working groups, none of its elements were fully implemented (see Box 1 below). 
Meanwhile, support for sanctions related to Russia’s role in eastern Ukraine is wavering in a 
number of EU member state capitals, including Paris and Berlin. Minsk II has slowed 
military escalation and drawn a very dangerous situation into a diplomatic process. At the 
moment, however, the package cannot be practically implemented owing to its contradictory 
provisions and the limited interest of all participating parties.  
2. Minsk II process in stalemate   
Thus the Normandy format that facilitates the Minsk process entered a deadlock.5 Following 
the meeting on 4 March 2016 German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine and the poor progress 
made during the meeting: “I’m afraid the situation in eastern Ukraine really isn’t being 
                                                   
2 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 
2014 (www.osce.org/home/123257).  
3 Minsk Agreement: Full text in English (www.unian.info/politics/1043394-minsk-agreement-full-
text-in-english.html). 
4 Council of the EU (2015), “Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months” 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/21-russia-sanctions/). 
5 A. Moshes (2016), “A year since Minsk-2: Does the agreement have a future?”, FIIA Comment, 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki (www.fiia.fi/en/publication/566/ 
a_year_since_minsk-2/). 
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viewed seriously enough, and it can escalate again at any time”.6 OSCE observers report 
ceasefire violations on a daily basis, which increased in spring.7  
Indeed, although the Minsk process de-escalated the fighting, many of its 13 points have not 
been implemented, including a complete ceasefire (see Table 1 below). Only partial 
withdrawal of heavy weapons took place and OSCE is not able to fully control this 
withdrawal. Russian armed formations are present on the ground while disarmament of the 
militias is yet to take place. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is tasked with monitoring 
implementation of the agreements. Yet it lacks resources and its access to the territories held 
by separatists has been limited. Its civil mandate is not adequate for such a tense and violent 
situation.8 Constitutional reform, elections and establishing the special status of separatist 
held territories have not taken place. Prisoner amnesty, exchange of hostages and access to 
separatist held territories for distribution of humanitarian assistance remain problematic. 
Ukrainian authorities still do not control the state border with Russia.  
Table 1. Minsk II: Points and state of implementation 
Points State of implementation  
1. Ceasefire Not implemented 
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons and establishment of security zone Partially implemented  
3. Monitoring and verification of ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy 
weapons by the OSCE 
Partially implemented 
4. Modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation 
and the law of Ukraine “on interim local self-government” 
Partially implemented  
5. Amnesty  Not implemented 
6. Exchange of prisoners  Partially implemented 
7. Humanitarian assistance  Not implemented  
8. Determination of the procedure for the full restoration of socio-
economic relations 
Partially implemented 
9. Handover of control over the Russia-Ukraine border from the 
Ukrainian side to Kyiv 
Not implemented 
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment, and 
mercenaries and disarmament of all illegal groups  
Not implemented 
11. Constitutional reform including decentralisation and special status 
for separatist held regions 
Partially implemented 
12. Holding elections in accordance with OCSE standards and 
monitored by ODHIR 
Not implemented  
13. Trilateral working groups Implemented, but with 
limited results 
                                                   
6 “Ukrainian foreign minister Klimkin says no breakthrough in Ukraine talks”, 3 March 2016 
(www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-foreign-minister-klimkin-says-no-breakthrough-in-ukraine-talks/a-
19093100).  
7 Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine gathers information and reports on the security situation daily and in 
response to specific incidents (www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports). 
8 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117795). 
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Meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) intensified within three sub-groups on 
political, humanitarian and security issues. Yet one former Ukrainian TCG representative 
called the negotiations “below the waterline”.9 Indeed, the TCG’s substantive contribution to 
resolving sensitive issues has been rather limited.  
While the diplomatic process is stalemated and low intensity war continues, the existing 
compromise on EU sanctions is shaky. The blame game between Ukraine and Russia for 
non-implementation of the Minsk agreements is ongoing. A panel of eminent persons from 
OSCE member states, including Russia, describes the fulfilment of the Minsk agreements as a 
“starting point for the development of a sustainable political, military and economic 
settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine.”10 Yet other than reinforcing the OSCE 
Special Monitoring Mission and creating a contact group, the panel has very few ideas and 
cannot fully agree on how to implement Minsk II. The Russian panel participant even 
refused to sign the final document, which shows that even in such a diplomatic group it is 
difficult to find common ground. Despite Russia’s opposition, a rethink of Minsk II is needed 
in order to avoid another major escalation and to link sanctions to progress on the ground. 
The EU should use its bargaining position based on sanctions to explore Russia’s flexibility 
regarding adjusting the agreement to the changing situation in Ukraine. 
At the same time, Russia successfully opened a parallel channel with the US to test the 
flexibility of both the US and the EU. This unofficial format was created in May 2015 between 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karsin and Assistant Secretary of State Victoria 
Nuland and was upgraded via a January 2016 meeting between Nuland and Special 
Presidential Advisor Vladislav Surkov in Kaliningrad region.11 Unlike the multilateral 
Normandy format and the TCG, this bilateral US-Russia channel is not designed for 
systematic or comprehensive negotiations but rather for devising “creative solutions” to the 
conflict in the Donbas region. Beside the fact that the Ukrainian leadership has no say in this 
format, as opposed to the Normandy format, it is non-transparent and politically 
unaccountable.12 While the Normandy format focuses only on the Ukraine crisis, these 
bilateral meetings deal with both Ukraine and Syria. This is a great success for Moscow, 
because it always aimed to link the Ukrainian and Syrian crises in order to facilitate package 
deals. Moscow wants to solve the Ukraine crisis to protect its sphere of interest; the US wants 
to solve the Syrian conflict to stabilise the region and stamp out Islamic State. This interest 
constellation creates leeway for “creative solutions” possible at the expense of Ukraine, given 
the absence of the EU and Ukraine at the table.  
                                                   
9 Роман Беcсмертный: Переговоры по Донбассу находятся “ниже нулевой отметки”, 22 February 
2016 (http://apostrophe.com.ua/article/politics/2016-02-22/roman-bezsmertnyiy-peregovoryi-po-
donbassu-nahodyatsya-nije-nulevoy-otmetki/3409). 
10 “Back to diplomacy”, Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on 
European Security as a Common Project, November 2015, p. 13 
(www.osce.org/networks/205846?download=true).  
11 “Top U.S., Kremlin Officials Meet For Ukraine Talks Near Kaliningrad”, RFE/RL, 15 January 2016 
(www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-russia-us-nuland-surkov-talks/27490535.html). 
12 “Surkov-Nuland Talks on Ukraine: A Non-transparent Channel (Part One)”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Vol. 13, Issue 103, 26 May 2016 (www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45469&tx_ttnews 
[backPid]=7&cHash=14360a78e74a1b2ae7781be064e0161a#.V0sFY2aGiVR). 
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3. Non-implementable agreement? 
Important parts of the agreement are difficult to implement in a short to medium term for 
Ukraine and Russia and its backed separatists. Not only is there disagreement over specific 
points but the order of implementation is a subject of fierce debate. The EU faces a dilemma, 
because Brussels has limited leeway on Russia while Moscow has used the war in eastern 
Ukraine to put pressure on Kyiv and the other states of the Normandy format. Sanctions are 
the main EU instrument for pressuring Russia to make compromises. Even if it is difficult to 
measure how far sanctions influence Russian cost-benefit calculations, as the main response 
to Russian aggression they are crucial to sustaining EU credibility. At the same time, 
financial sanctions have an impact on refinancing Russian debt on the global financial 
market and limit foreign direct investment in the Russian economy.13 Their main impact is to 
exacerbate the effects of low energy prices (and limited diversification of the Russian 
economy) and the poor investment climate in Russia owing to the growing role of the state in 
the economy, systemic corruption and the lack of rule of law.  
3.1 Russian reluctance 
Russia still portrays itself as a non-party to the conflict, which makes any solution difficult. 
Russia and its backed separatists are not likely to move ahead with comprehensive cessation 
of hostilities across the de facto line of contact, ensure access for OSCE monitors or hand over 
border control to Ukrainian authorities.  
Although Russia has no interest in a large-scale military campaign at this stage, 
comprehensive cessation of hostilities is not in its interest. Incidents on the de facto line of 
contact are a valuable means for Russia to use (the threat of) renewed hostilities in order to 
influence Kyiv and the international community: it improves Russia’s bargaining position in 
the Normandy format.   
Moreover, ensuring full access for OSCE monitors to verify the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons and creating a security zone will remain difficult to implement. Russia and DPR 
and LPR leaders are reluctant to provide access to OSCE monitors, which will expose their 
unwillingness to halt hostilities. They are only allowed to supervise two checkpoints at the 
Gukovo and Donetsk border crossings. This means the monitoring mission can only observe 
official border crossing on two checkpoints on the separatist side.14 
Finally, Russia will not agree to hand over border control to the Ukrainian authorities as long 
as it is not necessary in its cost-benefit calculation. It would practically mean losing influence 
over the DPR and the LPR, which is a very high price to pay for the Russian regime. 
Ukrainian forces would be able to regain control over the territories, thus denying Russia its 
leverage over Kyiv through separatist-controlled areas.  
3.2 Ukraine’s indisposition  
In an unstable political environment, Ukraine is unlikely to carry out a meaningful 
constitutional reform addressing decentralisation with a special reference to certain areas of 
                                                   
13 See BOFIT Forecast for Russia 2016-2018, Bank of Finland Forecast for Russia 2016-2018, 21 March 
2016 (www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/ennuste/Documents/brf116.pdf). 
14 O. Removska, D. Sindelar and L. Wannek, “Under Fire in Ukraine, OSCE Questions Its Worth”, 14 
November 2014 (www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crisis-russia-osce-monitoring-mission/ 
26690263.html). 
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the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, even if the High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn insist on it.15 Neither the president nor the 
new government can afford to waste political capital in pushing through a politically 
sensitive and extremely unpopular reform. While Russian leadership can just decide to 
withdraw troops without asking the Duma, Ukrainian authorities need public support for 
such a decision by its parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Such public support will not 
materialise as long as Russia and its proxies do not observe the ceasefire and the situation in 
separatist-held parts of Donbas remains volatile. There is no trust between Moscow and 
Kyiv.  
Moreover, Ukraine and Russia have a different vision of decentralisation in the long term. At 
some point, Kyiv might be ready to grant some cultural, financial, linguistic and educational 
autonomy to parts of Donbas. However, Russia supports a sort of decentralisation that will 
empower regions of Ukraine to veto Ukraine’s possible NATO and EU integration. The 
vision of many security people in Moscow is not stabilisation but a kind of a ‘Bosniasation’ of 
Ukraine: rendering it a dysfunctional and divided state, which is easier for Moscow to 
control than a functioning state. 
Ukraine has made some progress in implementing the Minsk agreement. In September 2014, 
its parliament, on the president’s initiative, adopted the law “on the special procedure of 
local self-governance in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions”.16 In March 2015, 
the Verkhovna Rada amended the law to provide basic requirements for holding local 
elections and adopted a resolution on the determination of individual regions, cities, towns 
and villages of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions where the special procedure for local self-
government would be introduced. Thus legislation allowing special treatment of the 
currently uncontrolled territories is already largely in place. Yet enforcing the legislation 
remains uncertain and the separatist side and the Russian government do not accept the law 
as being in line with the agreement.17  
On 16 September 2014, in line with the Minsk agreement, the Ukrainian parliament passed a 
law granting amnesty to those involved in the Donbas events, except for persons who 
committed “grave crimes”.18 In the context of an ongoing war, when lives are lost nearly 
daily, it makes no sense to implement the agreement for amnesty. As of 15 February 2016, 
the conflict had claimed officially 9,167 lives and injured 21,044.19 Even if the amnesty is 
pushed through by Ukrainian authorities, it is not likely to achieve much on its own. The 
reintegration of the separatist regions into Ukraine can only be successful when amnesty is 
implemented with clear conditions, including investigation and prosecution of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.   
                                                   
15 Joint statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner 
Johannes Hahn on the vote on constitutional amendments related to the judiciary by the Parliament of 
Ukraine, 02 June 2016 (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160602_02_en.htm). 
16 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Laws, 16 September 2014 (mfa.gov.ua/en/news-
feeds/foreign-offices-news/27948-shhodo-uhvalennya-verkhovnoju-radoju-ukrajinizakoniv-ukrajini). 
17 “Ukrainian Parliament OKs Bill On Special Status For Rebel East”, RFE/RL, 30 March 2016 
(www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-parliament-special-status-donbas-east/26906026.html). 
18 “Ukraine Parliament Grants Self-Rule to Eastern Regions”, 16 September 2014 (www.voanews.com/ 
content/ukraine-parliament-adopts-law-on-self-rule-for-eastern-region/2451232.html). 
19 “Donbas death toll through all period of conflict totals 9,167 persons; 21,440 wounded”, Interfax 
News Ukraine, 3 March 2016 (http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/328894.html).  
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Linking decentralisation with the ‘special status’ for the two separatist regions was a major 
mistake, because it discredits the possible benefits of decentralisation reform for Ukrainian 
society. It is an example of how parts of the Minsk II agreement are linked with issues that 
are important to the future of the Ukrainian state. Decentralisation reform is an important 
initiative for the efficiency of the Ukrainian state through the distribution of resources to 
regional and local administrations. Its delay is negative for the entire reform process. 
3.3 In what sequence? 
Ukraine and Russia also disagree on the sequencing of the agreement’s implementation. For 
Kyiv, ceasefire, withdrawal of military equipment, foreign troops and mercenaries, 
prisoners’ exchange and taking over border control should be implemented first. Elections 
and enforcing the law on the special status of certain parts of the Donbas region will not be 
agreed to in the current volatile security environment.  
In contrast, the Kremlin prioritises constitutional reform with the stress on decentralisation, 
elections (‘federalisation’), the law on the special status of certain parts of the Donbas and 
amnesty. During this year’s annual phone-in conference, President Putin stated, “It is 
necessary to accept – for all to agree and sit down at the negotiating table – to accept the 
constitution and on the basis of the constitution to hold elections. That is the way to get out 
of the crisis.”20 
There are big differences on how Russia and Ukraine interpret these conditions in separatist 
controlled territories. Russia’s representative in the Trilateral Contact Group, Boris Gryzlov, 
stated, “[T]he urgent need to ensure security and guarantee full ceasefire cannot justify a 
delay of the Donbas elections and consequently of the political settlement for three, five or 
ten years. On the contrary, if we embark on the path of postponing the political settlement, 
the situation may indeed get worse.”21 Germany and France push for a strict implementation 
of the Minsk agreement. The German Foreign Office has prepared a road map for elections in 
the separatist territories and is lobbying in Kyiv for the preparation of elections. At the same 
time, the situation in the separatist ‘republics’ looks rather negative.   
Free and fair elections are not possible without necessary conditions on the ground. Until 
security requirements are addressed, a free press cannot operate and monitoring of the 
elections by international and Ukrainian organisations cannot be guaranteed. How can 
ODIHR election observers do their work in the separatist territories if the OSCE monitoring 
mission has no access at all? How can the safety of civil observers be guaranteed if they are 
attacked every week?  
Even if the security conditions are provided, there are still disagreements over the modalities 
of the elections. Russia-backed separatists refuse to allow the participation of pan-Ukrainian 
political parties or the use of a proportional election system. This gives the impression that 
Russia and the separatists have no interest in political competition. Their main aim is to 
legitimise their rule over the territory they have occupied. The separatists also reject the 
                                                   
20 Vladimir Putin, “$2bn linked to Panama Papers was spent on expensive classical instruments - and 
what else we learnt from Russian President‘s phone-in”, Telegraph, 14 April 2016 
(www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/14/vladimir-putins-phone-in-with-russia/). 
21 “Russian official: Donbass security is impossible without political settlement” 
(http://tass.ru/en/politics/864605, TASS, 23 March 2016, tass.ru/en/politics/864605).  
8  KOSTANYAN & MEISTER 
 
Ukrainian government’s insistence on the right of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to vote 
in elections without travelling to the territories.  
3.4 What is definite 
Regarding the lack of implementation, the first four points of the Minsk II agreement are 
clearly defined. Point one demands an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Point two requires the withdrawal of all heavy weapons by 
both parties behind clearly defined lines, and point three outlines an “effective monitoring 
and verification by the OSCE of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons”. Point 
four clarifies the next steps with regard to local elections and a special regime, which has to 
be confirmed by the Ukrainian parliament no later than 30 days from the agreement’s 
signing date. While point four is something Ukraine has to implement by itself, or has to be 
implemented in coordination with the separatists, the other three points can only be 
implemented if Russia and its proxies cooperate with Ukrainian authorities. Without a fully 
functioning ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons and access of OSCE monitors to the 
separatist regions, there will be no effective dialogue on elections or a special status for the 
DNR and the LNR. An important additional point is the release and exchange of hostages 
and illegally detained persons based on the principle “all for all”, which has to be 
implemented no later than the fifth day after the withdrawal (point six).  
4. Limits of diplomacy and sanctions  
The stalemated Minsk process was periodically co-opted by both Ukrainian and Russian 
politicians. President Petro Poroshenko and ex-Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk used the 
conflict to deflect attention from lagging domestic reform and chronic inner squabbling.22  
Russia got everything it wanted in the Minsk II agreement, including decentralisation, status 
for separatist held areas and amnesty. The Ukrainian leadership accepted this agreement at a 
time when its army was under great military pressure from the separatists and Russian 
army. Presently, the Russian leadership, playing for time, blames the Ukrainian authorities 
for non-implementation of the Minsk agreement. The more time drags on, the worse the 
situation in Ukraine becomes owing to political disputes and a worsening economic 
situation. 
In its relations with the EU, Russia’s main problems are the financial sanctions and if there 
would be constraints imposed on large-scale projects like Nord Stream 2. However, because 
of several anti-sanction statements from representatives of EU member states, the Kremlin 
has at the moment the impression that it can get rid of the sanctions without making any 
serious steps towards implementation of the Minsk agreements. 
Indeed, the consensus for sanctions in the EU is shaky. In particular, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, 
Austria and Hungary, and some politicians in Germany and France, have come out against 
extending sanctions. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni stated: “We cannot take for 
                                                   
22 See speech of and discussion with Petro Poroshenko at the 2016 Munich Security conference where 
he very emotionally talked about the war in eastern Ukraine but had limited answers on the reform 
process in Ukraine: Petro Poroshenko, Speech at the 52th Munich Security Conference, 12-14 February 
2016 (www.president.gov.ua/en/videos/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-myunhenskij-bezpekovij-
konfere-182).  
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granted any decision at this stage.”23 Italy’s Veneto Regional Council went as far as passing a 
resolution recognising Crimea as Russian and calling for lifting sanctions.24 Hungary Foreign 
Minister Peter Szijjarto spoke against automatic renewal of sanctions, stating, “You cannot 
decide on sanctions by sweeping the issues under the carpet…We believe that the question 
of sanctions should be decided at the highest level.”25 
Germany’s Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economy Sigmar Gabriel insisted the role of 
sanctions is not to bring about political and economic chaos in Russia but to “help solve the 
conflict in Ukraine, not to force Russia to its knees.”26 At a speech at the German-Russian 
Forum in mid-March 2016 in Berlin, Gabriel quoted the French Minister of Economy, who in 
Moscow had said, “The goal that we all share is to give up sanction in the upcoming 
summer, because the Minsk process is respected”. Reacting to this quotation, Gabriel said, 
“Indeed, this must be our common goal.”27 French Minister of Agriculture Stéphane Le Foll 
also expressed a clear anti-sanction view: “Of course, I want the sanctions to be cancelled 
very much. The president of France wants it and the government shares this point of view as 
well.”28 Moreover, although less than one-fifth of the deputies participated, the French 
National Assembly passed a resolution arguing against extending EU sanctions against 
Russia.29 Indeed, the EU member states show signs of less unity this time around and 
reaching a compromise between them will likely prove more difficult.  
At the same time, at the end of May, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
proposed a gradual lifting of the sanctions if there were to be substantial progress in Eastern 
Ukraine.30 That means that the goal would no longer be full implementation of the Minsk II 
agreement before the EU would lift sanctions, but rather simply to induce Russia to take 
some visible steps towards implementation of the agreement. The problem with Steinmeier’s 
proposal, however, is that it is not the result of any visible concessions on the part of Russia, 
but rather that it reflects his concern that even if the European Council succeeds in reaching 
agreement to renew the sanctions at its meeting in June, it will be more difficult to maintain 
that consensus when the question appears again on the European Council’s agenda at the 
                                                   
23 “Italy, Hungary say no automatic renewal of Russia sanctions”, Reuters, 14 March 2016 
(uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-eu-idUKKCN0WG1B4). 
24 “Veneto Regional Council calls for recognizing Russia's annexation of Crimea”, Ukraine Today, 18 
May 2016 (uatoday.tv/politics/veneto-regional-council-calls-for-recognizing-russia-s-annexation-of-
crimea-650795.html). 
25 “Italy, Hungary say no automatic renewal of Russia sanctions”, Reuters, 14 March 2016 
(uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-eu-idUKKCN0WG1B4). 
26 “Germany warns against tougher sanctions on Russia”, DW, 4 January 2015 
(www.dw.com/en/germany-warns-against-tougher-sanctions-on-russia/a-18169784). 
27 Transcription of speech by Sigmar Gabriels at the German-Russian Forum, Berlin, 17 March 2016 
(available from the authors). 
28 “Paris confirms support for lifting sanctions against Russia”, (https://rbth.com/international/ 
2016/02/02/paris-confirms-support-for-lifting-sanctions-against-russia_564219). 
29 Analyse du scrutin n° 1267. Première séance du 28/04/2016. Scrutin public sur la proposition de 
résolution invitant le Gouvernement à ne pas renouveler les mesures restrictives et les sanctions 
économiques imposées par l’Union européenne à la Fédération de Russie (art. 34-1 de la Constitution) 
(www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/%28legislature%29/14/%28num%29/1267). 
30 Auswärtiges Amt, Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier beim Deutsch Russischen 
Forum/Potsdamer Begegnungen, 30.05.2016 (www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/ 
Reden/2016/160530_BM_DEU_RUS_Forum.html). 
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end of the year. In effect, the EU is putting itself under severe pressure, not because of the 
situation in Eastern Ukraine but because of the lack of consensus among the member states, 
which weakens its own bargaining position. 
5. Keep the sanctions 
The sanctions have become an important element in the Kremlin’s policy of testing the unity 
of the EU member states. At the same time, however, together with low energy prices, the 
global economic slowdown and bad economic policy, they affect the Russian economy.31 
Moscow's pivot to China has failed, and it is trying to protect its economic and energy ties 
with the EU. These circumstances have improved the bargaining position of the EU and its 
member states vis-à-vis Russia with regard to the situation in eastern Ukraine if only the 
member states are committed to remain united and challenge large-scale energy projects like 
Nord Stream 2.  
Even worse, if the European Council does not manage to prolong the sanctions in August, it 
will weaken the EU’s position in negotiations and its credibility in Kyiv and the wider 
region. If the EU is not consistent on sanctions, it is likely to lose its leverage in the Ukrainian 
reform process and send a distressing message to the Ukrainian people who were on the 
Euromaidan that they stand alone against Russian aggression, thus further destabilising the 
country.  
The EU’s inability to prolong sanctions will send the message to Moscow, that the 
destabilisation of countries in the common neighbourhood, including via military action, will 
have very limited or no consequences. Even if the sanctions are limited, they are an 
important instrument to show unity and to draw a red line demarcating unacceptable 
Russian action.  
It is a strategic mistake that some member state leaders are talking about lifting sanctions or 
linking Ukraine’s fate to Syria’s,32 as the US has done, because it sends the wrong message to 
Moscow. The Kremlin is under the impression that it can get rid of sanctions without 
compromise. The EU and its member states need to be clear that they support sanctions. This 
approach will improve the EU’s bargaining position. If nothing is changed in the foreseeable 
future and Russia does not compromise or, worse, escalates the conflict, the EU ought to 
consider increasing sanctions and clearly tell Moscow that it is doing so, as happened at the 
G7 meeting in May 2016 in Japan.33 
The most interesting point Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev made at the Munich 
security conference was not his argument about a new cold war but about Russia’s 
willingness to “listen to different ideas, including compromise” with regard to the situation 
in eastern Ukraine.34 This has never been elaborated and even rigorous adherence to the 
Minsk agreements will not solve the current stalemate. Presently, the circumstances Russians 
                                                   
31 “Russia Economic Report 35: The Long Journey to Recovery”, World Bank 
(www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/06/russia-economic-report-35). 
32 “Syria and Ukraine: two fronts in Russian war for influence”, Reuters, 1 October 2015 
(www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-ukraine-idUSKCN0RV4RS20151001).  
33 Cameron, “G7 Countries Agree 'Vital' To Extend Russia Sanctions”, RFE/RL, 30 May 2016 
(www.rferl.org/content/g7-cameron-russia-sanctions/27761035.html).  
34 Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the Munich conference. Full text 
(http://freenews.xyz/2016/02/13/dmitry-medvedevs-speech-at-the-munich-conference-full-text/). 
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and Ukrainians find themselves in have changed. Ukraine has improved its military position 
and the Russian leadership gave up the Novorossiya (i.e. New Russia) project and the 
country continues to drift into a substantial recession. Therefore, it makes sense under the 
new conditions to allow Kyiv and Moscow more flexible in their implementation or 
adaptation of the agreement. Some parts need clarification and the order of implementation 
needs to be changed. At the moment it is easy for the Russian leadership to blame the 
Ukrainian government for not fulfilling its part, yet it is first of all Russia that has not 
respected the ceasefire and full withdrawal of heavy weapons. The separatists need to meet 
these conditions if elections are to be organised. There should be a clear list of what has to be 
done to prepare elections on the ground, both in terms of security and modalities. If these 
conditions are not met, elections should not take place.  
Strategic patience with regard to sanctions is therefore more important than quick solutions. 
In fact, there are no sustainable quick fixes for the crisis in eastern Ukraine. The current focus 
of Germany, France and the US on pushing quick solutions will not work. Only if Moscow 
believes it cannot get rid of the sanctions soon can the Russian leadership be influenced. It is 
therefore better to leave sanctions in place rather than make compromises, which give 
Moscow more ammunition. The EU (and US) sanctions on Russia are an important tool to 
win time for Ukraine. More resources and energy ought to be invested in Ukraine to make 
sure that Kyiv really uses this time to reform and rebuild the state.35 Giving up on sanctions 
without any political gain would declare the bankruptcy of the EU in international conflict 
resolution.  
6. The way forward 
Security for elections: Before elections can take place in eastern Ukraine, it is necessary to 
improve the security situation. The current OSCE mission is not sufficient. A plausible 
option could be expanding it, with more observers (up to 1,000) and a more robust mandate. 
The Russian leadership and the separatists should guarantee their security in the separatist 
territories. In fact, in such a war situation it is not an observer but an international peace-
keeping mission that should take responsibility. Along a fragile and dangerous contact line, 
the conditions have to be improved for observers to do their job without fearing for their 
lives. Russia can be involved in ensuring the security of the observers but only in the context 
of an international peacekeeping mission. The observers should be allowed to access the 
separatist territories to be able to monitor withdrawal of heavy weapons from the separatist 
side. Only then will it make sense to put the Ukrainian side under pressure to withdraw their 
heavy weapons.  
Since Russia is not ready to give border control to Ukraine before the elections, as an 
alternative, the OSCE Gukovo and Donetsk operations should be extended along the whole 
border on the Ukrainian side. The mission should have an enhanced mandate and resources 
to be able to effectively control the border. Here as well it would make sense to have a UN 
peacekeeping mission. Only if international peacekeepers control the border and no Russian 
weapons and fighters/soldiers flow in and out is it realistic to organise elections and hand 
over the border to the Ukrainians at a later stage. This will give the Ukrainian government a 
                                                   
35 For the past two years nearly all economic indicators for Ukraine have been negative. The recent 
changes of the prime minister and the prosecutor, both from the president’s political camp, will not 
bring the necessary push for the reform process. See “Ukraine. Current economic data”, Ukraine-
Analysen, 168, 11 May 2016, pp. 22-25. 
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minimal guarantee that after elections in the separatist regions an international controlled 
handover of the border to Ukrainian border forces can take place. The complete lack of trust 
between Kyiv on the one hand and Russia and its proxies on the other can only be improved 
by international observers, independent information and international guarantees for 
Ukraine. 
Once the above mentioned minimum security conditions are ensured, the elections could be 
prepared. The election can be supervised by an OCSE police mission or a UN peacekeeping 
mission. Russia might be inclined to agree with OSCE or UN missions where it is 
represented. In terms of modalities, the pan-Ukrainian parties should be allowed to 
participate in the elections to ensure inclusive representation.  
Elections in turn can become bases for the introduction of amnesty and entering into force of 
the special status if the ODHIR assesses elections to be largely in line with international 
standards. The candidates that did not commit “grave crimes” may be covered by immunity 
before the day of elections and by amnesty after elections. Those who committed “grave 
crimes” should be held accountable. However, the constitutional reform and decentralisation 
should be delinked from the “special status” law, because linking them only overshadows 
the possible benefits of Ukraine’s decentralisation.  
Upgrade of the Normandy format: The Normandy format has done an important job in 
stopping the war and drawing the tense situation in eastern Ukraine into a diplomatic 
process, but it is in a stalemate at the moment. Whereas two prominent EU member states 
are part of the Normandy format, the US has its own (non-transparent) bilateral dialogue 
with Russia. Furthermore, it is not in the interest of the EU that Russia has its separate format 
with the US and that Washington is linking its talks with Moscow on Syria to the Ukrainian 
crisis. To involve the US in the new format would not only prevent possible compromises 
without the EU and Ukraine having their say, it would upgrade the format by creating a new 
dynamic for conflict settlement. 
With regard to the EU, two options exist: Either Germany and France use their political 
weight in the EU and coordinate talks with other member states and relevant EU institutions, 
or the High Representative Federica Mogherini and the European External Action Service 
represent the EU. An EU-US-Russia format could be the result of such changes, which, with 
the inclusion of Washington, would have greater political authority.   
Expanding the Normandy format and including the US makes sense not only for 
maintaining EU and US sanctions, but also for improving the bargaining position of the EU 
and increasing the importance of the negotiations for Moscow. Such an upgrade and high-
ranking negotiations are needed in order to push Russia to resolve issues such as an 
international monitoring mission or peacekeepers for the Ukrainian-Russian border.   
If Russia continues to block progress in the Normandy format and not allowing its upgrade, 
it should be clearly blamed for not being constructive. The EU and the US will have more 
legitimacy to support the stabilisation of Ukraine. EU member states and the US should 
demonstrate that they are willing to go further if Moscow is not constructive in solving the 
conflict.  
Strengthen Ukraine: The EU effort can only be fruitful if Ukraine becomes a success story. 
The current stagnation in the reform process, shrinking support for the president and 
government and the resignation of key reformers from the cabinet in the context of the 
election of a new prime minister plays into Moscow’s hands. As it stands, the Kremlin does 
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not need to do much because Ukrainian elites are bringing discredit upon themselves and 
derailing the reform process, without much Russian interference.   
The EU needs to invest more in the Ukrainian reforms, which means more financial support 
and resources but with even stronger conditionality. Brussels needs to increase the number 
of experts, who are not only supporting the Ukrainian government in the reform process but 
also working side by side with Ukrainian bureaucrats in the ministries. Ukrainian reform-
oriented civil society needs to be involved much more closely in the monitoring process and 
communication with the wider Ukrainian society. The role of civil society organisations has 
to be upgraded with regard to the government and bureaucrats. The EU should require 
necessary changes in the personal structure in key ministries and agencies, especially in 
fighting corruption and reforming the judiciary and the economy. This needs to be linked 
with higher financial obligations. Furthermore, Ukraine needs to look after the welfare of 
Ukrainians.  
All this will be easier if Ukraine is granted the European perspective. EU membership for 
Ukraine will not happen anytime soon, but it is a generational project.36 This carrot would 
renew the EU’s credibility in Ukrainian reformist circles, which are the main partners of 
Brussels. After all, the referendum in the Netherlands was first of all the result of frustration 
about the EU in the member states, the failure of the leading politicians to face populists and 
explain the importance of Ukraine to the credibility and security of Europe. Even if it is 
partially interpreted as a refusal of EU membership for Ukraine, it is crucial for European 
politicians to promote the importance of stabilising Ukraine for Europe’s security. The 
current Russian leadership has no interest in the Ukraine’s stabilization, preferring a weak 
state which it can control by informal and corrupt ties. This is not in the interest of the EU 
member states. Ukraine’s evolution over the coming years will have a significant influence 
on the future of Russia and its relations with Europe. Stability will not come by making 
compromises with Russia on Ukraine and accepting the grey zone between Russia and the 
EU, but by supporting Ukraine to become a European success story. This would set a 
positive example for some countries in the post-Soviet space, thus facilitating the 
transformation of other countries of the region and ultimately triggering a change in Russia 
itself. 
Concluding remarks 
In sum, a revised Minsk II agreement would need to start with a fully functioning ceasefire, 
credible weapons withdrawal on both sides, withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
Ukrainian territory and the release of all hostages. The next step needs to be international 
control not only of the contact line between the Ukrainian state and the separatist regions but 
also of the Russian-Ukrainian border. Only if these preconditions are fulfilled does it make 
sense to discuss lifting sanctions. It could be an option to link the implementation of these 
steps to the gradual lifting of sanctions, but then it must also be possible to re-impose or 
increase sanctions if developments are stagnating or going in the wrong direction. All these 
points are preconditions for the preparation of elections in the separatist regions, possible 
changes in the Ukrainian constitution and decentralisation.  
                                                   
36 D. Hamilton and S. Meister (2016), “What the West must do with the common neighborhood?”, in 
The Eastern Question: Russia, the West and Europe’s Grey Zone, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, 
Washington, D.C., pp. 52-77 (https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_downloads/ 
meister_and_hamilton_section_2_part_2.pdf).  
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Finally, as long as the Ukrainian state is not stabilised and crucial security and social 
institutions are not rebuilt, it is dangerous to organise elections in the separatist regions and 
give them a special status or any political influence over Kiev. There is a decided risk that 
certain criminal and military elements will spill over into Ukraine. If securing stability and 
security in Europe is the goal of EU policy, then functioning institutions of the Ukrainian 
state are crucial preconditions. It is therefore more important to invest political and financial 
capital in the Ukrainian reform process than in the implementation of Minsk II in its current 
form. A successful reform process and stabilisation of the Ukrainian state will improve the 
bargaining position of the EU, thus allowing it to accomplish more vis-à-vis Russia and the 
separatists as part of its ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Europe.  
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